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Introduction
The introduction of university tuition fees has been a contentious issue 
in UK politics for the past decade. As well as igniting wide public debate, 
it also gave rise to fierce student protests and contributed to a decline in 
support for the Liberal Democrat Party (Lewis et al. 2010; Phipps 2014; Gil 
2015). This social unrest and change in the political landscape are one out-
come of the profound transformation of the way English higher education 
is funded. It used to be regarded as a “public good,” funded through a block 
grant that allowed English universities to provide education at a very low 
cost. But through gradual withdrawal of central government funding, the 
provision of undergraduate university teaching is now financed by tuition 
fees covered by government loans. As a result, higher education has been 
transformed from a public good to a public asset.
In this chapter, we focus on the reorganization of government funding 
for higher education that has enabled this creation of a public asset, what 
this entails, and the consequences that follow. We analyze this transforma-
tion in order to understand the specific features of financialization (Chia-
pello 2015; Engelen 2008; Van Der Zwan 2014; Davis and Kim 2015) that 
transform the public sector. The financialization of services that used to 
be considered the responsibility of the state has attracted little sociological 
attention and so here we will shed light on the practices of valuation to see 
how the monetary value of both the public good of higher education and 
the student loans are performed and accounted for.
The chapter starts by exploring the notion of a public good as under-
stood by economists and how this has been analyzed and critiqued by 
sociologists and scholars from science and technology studies (STS). We 
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then focus on recent STS work on assetization to open up a space for con-
sidering the creation of public assets. We use the empirical focus of higher 
education funding in England and its transformation from direct funding 
to income contingent repayment loans to explore in detail how a public 
asset is made. We argue that what is particularly important is the creation 
of an impaired asset through accounting techniques that continuously (re)
compose its value. Impairment, we conclude, is what enables the asset to 
maintain the principal features of a public good even when transformed 
into a public asset.
Theorizing a Public Good and a Financial Asset
The provision of public education was first formally classified in economics 
as a public good by Paul Samuelson (1955), a Nobel Prize laureate. It is said 
that Samuelson was an economist who “transform[ed] his discipline from 
one that ruminates about economic issues to one that solves problems” 
(Weinstein 2009) and was noted for making public good a textbook cat-
egory. According to economics, public goods have a set of particular char-
acteristics. A public good is non- rivalrous, it is a “collective consumption 
good,” which means it can be used simultaneously by more than one indi-
vidual without undermining the quality of the good (i.e., all the individu-
als using the good would benefit from its consumption in equal measure) 
(Samuelson 1954). A public good can also be consumed by everyone and 
not just those who paid for it (i.e., it is non- excludable). As a result of these 
features, economists suggest private (commercial, market) producers are 
prevented from benefiting from the provision of public goods to consum-
ers, resulting in their underproduction, prompting governments to enter 
the marketplace and become the provider of public goods.1
Publicly funded universities are routinely praised for delivering economic 
and social benefits (OECD 2015; Mountford- Zimdars et al. 2013; AAAS 2016) 
fitting a broader, normative sense of public good. However, transforming 
higher public education into a governmental asset is a relatively new devel-
opment. We start by looking more closely at the notion of a public good 
before paying close attention to the practices of economic valuation which 
we suggest underpin the transformation of such goods into assets.
Callon (1994) rejects the notion that science can be considered a public 
good through being non- rivalrous and non- excludable. Instead he argues 
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that scientific knowledge is as rivalrous and excludable as any other good. 
Science in this view accomplishes its status as a public good through “hybrid 
collectives” that continuously produce variety that leads to social change 
(Callon 1994, 407). Alternatively, Mirowski (2011) discusses public goods 
through the lens of its origin and evolution within neoliberal economics. He 
suggests that the concept has been contingent on the justification of gov-
ernment military spending changing attitudes to the public funding of sci-
entific knowledge and resulting in “the now- pervasive habit of treating the 
genesis of scientific knowledge as if it were production of a ‘thing,’ on a par 
with any other commodity” (Mirowski 2011, 58). Despite these differences 
in ways of critiquing the notion of public good, one shared premise of these 
authors is that science attains its status as a public good as a result of overly 
simplistic assumptions regarding the production of scientific knowledge.
Recently the range of public goods discussed has been broadened to include 
sustainability regulations and government cultural policies (Doganova and 
Laurent 2016; Pallesen 2016; O’Brien 2016). Here variation in public goods is 
linked together not only by the specific public nature of these goods but also 
by the focus of analysis, namely the practices of economic valuation (Roscoe 
and Townley 2016). The process of valuation is of an instrumental impor-
tance to these accounts of negotiating the worth of public goods, and this 
choice of an analytical tool is grounded in the turn of sociological attention 
to economic value and its formation (Stark 2011; Helgesson and Muniesa 
2013; Kornberger et al. 2015).
Although this move to study the practices of valuation that underpin 
the constitution of public goods is appealing, what of the move to trans-
form such goods into assets? The empirical case considered here is how 
English higher education funding underwent a transformation from direct 
public financing (a public good) to funding through the provision of loans 
to students; since loans are considered to be financial assets, here we focus 
on this type of asset being fully aware that an asset could be anything that 
enables capitalization. A financial asset is a category of financial account-
ing that is defined as “a resource controlled by the entity as a result of past 
events and from which future economic benefits are expected to flow to the 
entity” (IASB 2015, 220). Accounting for this resource thus requires stating 
a financial position that includes not just its costs but also the likelihood of 
accruing future financial benefits from an asset. In this way, financial assets, 
as an income- generating resource, produce capital, and can be viewed as 
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vehicles for capitalization. The latter is regarded as “the present value of a 
future stream of earnings: it tells us how much a capitalist would be pre-
pared to pay now to receive a flow of money later” (Nitzan and Bichler 2009, 
153, emphasis in original).
Research on the practices of valuation can be applied to these forms 
of assets in a similar manner to the aforementioned treatment of goods. 
Hence emerging STS research on the practices of valuation of future income 
streams— or assetization— focuses on practices that “settle” the value of 
“unsettled” assets, be it a financial value that accommodates moral and 
political values (Ortiz 2013) or a business model as an assetization device 
(Doganova and Muniesa 2015). One of the most immediate and primary 
practices are accountancy techniques, or “the miracles of bookkeeping” 
(Quinn 2017). Placing accounting practices at the heart of constructing 
profits and losses (or assets and expenses) and stressing that “‘profits’ are, 
quite literally, constructed by accountants,” Hatherly et al. (2008) empha-
size the importance of up- close study of financial reporting in the making 
(e.g., how accounting and bookkeeping training affects practices of clas-
sification and concept- application). This importance is further emphasized 
by Menniken and Millo (2016) in their study of the development of UK 
impairment rules for asset accounting wherein the authors demonstrate 
how such rules are rooted in different forms of valuation that result in the 
“hybridization” of managerial knowledge and financial economics. Intan-
gible asset accounting is also responsible for theorizing business entities 
(e.g., a firm) (Birch and Tyfield 2013; Birch 2017).
Collectively, these studies of goods and assets share an analytical focus on 
valuation practices that moves away from treating value as a stable, objective, 
exogenous entity that exists independent of practices of valuation. Instead, 
following Dewey (1915, 1939), Muniesa (2012, 28, 24) suggests a “pragmat-
ics of valuation in finance,” that assumes no “distance between value and 
its measure.” In this way, financial value is a practice (an act) and financial 
valuation involves double acts of capitalization involving both “the appraisal 
of the characteristics of something in terms of its value and the setting that 
thing for the purpose of making it valuable” (Muniesa 2011, 31).
How, then, might we take on this focus on valuation practices, account-
ing, and double acts of capitalization in making sense of the switch from 
public goods to public assets in English higher education? We suggest that 
one means to do this is provided by an expansion of the pragmatics of 
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valuation. Of crucial importance here is how acts of valuation relate to 
what is valued. To understand the process of assetization it is important to 
see value as action, a social practice, and process of doing (Muniesa 2012; 
Birch 2017) since “value both as an idea and as existence depends upon 
judgement on what to do” (Dewey 1915, cited in Muniesa 2012, 26). But 
what is also important, we argue, is to pay attention to what to do with 
what— the “thing” that has been made valuable that appears in the theo-
retical account of valuation (Muniesa 2012; Birch 2016).
Here we can return to Dewey (1937). He rigorously analyzed how a mat-
ter “is subjected to controlled inquiry,” how judgments are made about end-
lessly diverse subjects. Dewey (1937, 102) argued that in making a judgment 
about something— in our case committing an act of valuation— “formal con-
ceptions arise out of the ordinary transactions; they are not imposed upon 
[the transactions] from on high or from any external and a priori source.” 
This happens through inquiry that turns “indeterminate situations” (what 
is the value of something?) into “determinate” situations (the value is this) 
and such transformation is not just a matter of doubt, a mental task. “The 
doubtful [does not entirely] belong to us,” it belongs to the indeterminate 
situation (which involves the composition of the act of valuation, but also 
the matter that is subjected to the valuation). It becomes determinate or 
conceptualized “only by operations which … modify existing conditions” 
(Dewey 1937, 106, emphasis added). The matter under valuation cannot 
be disregarded, it is central to the valuation and, subsequently, its value. In 
the case of public assets what we need to understand, then, is the specific 
acts through which accounting becomes a basis for constituting in our case 
higher education and associated student loans as an asset. In treating the 
transformation of public goods into public assets as a valuation practice, we 
thus need to account for the kinds of entities under assessment— the form 
that goods, commodities, and assets take— and the valuation practices that 
accomplish those forms (see Braun, this volume).
English Higher Education and Its Funding
How does a public good become a public asset? In what way is the anoma-
lous nature of a public good consequential to the form of asset the good 
becomes? We address these questions by looking at the ways in which con-
version from public good to public asset is achieved while still maintaining 
Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/books/book/chapter-pdf/677248/9780262359030_c000900.pdf by guest on 02 June 2021
266 Sveta Milyaeva and Daniel Neyland
the characteristics of education as a public good provided through its non- 
excludable and non- rivalrous characteristics. The aim of what follows next 
is not to provide a detailed history of the relationship between the state and 
universities in England, but rather to signpost the changing logic of this 
relationship in terms of its evolution from how higher education became a 
public good to changes in higher education that enabled its gradual move 
toward being accounted for as an asset.
English Higher Education— Becoming a Public Good
The record of state involvement in higher education in England could be 
said to begin in the nineteenth century. Prior to this period of time, the two 
major centers— Oxford and Cambridge— were independent wealthy enti-
ties reliant on endowments with no financial support from the state. The 
nineteenth century saw the state’s involvement in shaping English higher 
education through its legal interventions in Oxbridge which aimed to reori-
ent these institutions toward national education, as part of a government 
move to expand university provision (Vernon 2004).
The direct and centrally coordinated financial support of higher edu-
cation institutions through block grants— the initial transformation of 
university education into a public good— began with the establishment of 
the University Grants Committee (UGC) in 1919. The UGC was account-
able to the Treasury until 1963 and then moved under the jurisdiction of 
the Department of Education and Science.2 Until 1946, the UGC’s role was 
to guide the allocation of “deficiency grants” designed to help financially 
when required (Shattock and Berdahl 1984, 472). However, in 1946 its 
purpose was reassessed with the view that “the time had come when the 
Government was bound to assure itself that somewhere in the University 
system provision is made for every field of scholarship or science which is 
necessary to the national interest” (Hetherington 1954, cited in Owen 1980, 
264, emphasis added). The Education Act of 1962 made higher education 
free by requiring local authorities (but effectively the Treasury) to pay uni-
versity fees for students,3 while the Robbins Report of 1963 introduced the 
idea of higher education as a citizens’ right, thus articulating the concept 
of higher education as a public good. The government financing of higher 
education grew from 33.6 percent of all income received by universities 
(including endowments and fees) in 1921 to 76.4 percent in 1973 (Owen 
1985, 46– 47).
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The steady increase in public financing of universities became prob-
lematic with the expansion of higher education. There were no new uni-
versities established between 1969 and 1992 in the UK, although higher 
education participation was growing steadily (Collini 2012).4 This changed 
with government reform through the 1988 Education Reform Act and the 
1992 Further and Higher Education Act. The reform reclassified polytech-
nics into universities and triggered the expansion of these new universities; 
as a result, the higher education participation rate in England rose from 15 
percent in 1988 to 47 percent in 2014 (McGettigan 2013; UK Government 
2015b). New legislation has also reformed the funding bodies: the Univer-
sity Grants Committee was replaced by the Universities Funding Council 
in 1989, and in 1992 the Higher Education Funding Council for England 
(HEFCE) was formed to oversee funding of English universities.5
The post- 1992 rise in student numbers and the expansion of universities 
was a tipping point that led to a rethinking of higher education as a public 
good funded by tax revenues. Yet doubts regarding the sustainability of such 
funding had already set in during the late 1970s and early 1980s, as “the vir-
tual zero growth of GNP [gross national product] has meant that increased 
education expenditure in real terms can only come at the expense of real 
reductions elsewhere” (Craven et al 1983, 579). Along with growing funding 
in the 1960s and 1970s came risk: exposure to government cuts resulting 
from economic fluctuations was the corollary of universities’ dependence 
on public money (Anderson 2016).
The Introduction and Reclassification of Student Loans
Growing concerns over the sustainability of public financing of university 
teaching prompted the first introduction of student loans in 1990. Kenneth 
Baker (1986, cited in Wilson 1997, 12), at the time the Secretary of State for 
Education, reasoned that “student numbers in higher education are at an 
all- time record level [and] we want still more to benefit. … But in doing so 
we must have regard to the claims on national resources. That is why I think 
that the time is ripe to investigate with an open mind all possible forms and 
sources of support.” Limited national resources became a basis for justify-
ing the introduction of alternative sources of support for students— in the 
form of loans. However, these changes in the government’s vision of how 
higher education ought to be financed did not start with the introduction 
of tuition fees payable by students to cover the costs of courses (that would 
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come later). Making students pay expenses previously settled by govern-
ment was initially implemented through the introduction of loans to cover 
students’ costs of living (rather than the cost of courses) and these loans 
were designed to make up the difference that resulted from a freeze in the 
annual increase of student maintenance grants (Barr 1989).6
Through the Education (Student Loans) Act of 1990 (UK Government 
1990) maintenance loans were introduced. These took the form of fixed- 
term mortgage- style loans with sixty equal monthly payments that had to 
be made once the borrower’s income was over 85 percent of national aver-
age earnings. Once this threshold was met, monthly repayments ensued, 
depending on the size of the outstanding balance rather than any subse-
quent fluctuations in the loanee’s salary. The loans were implemented in 
September 1990 and the Student Loan Company (SLC) was established to 
handle the administration of these and all subsequent loans (Hillman 2013).
However, this solution to the rising cost of higher education was not 
viewed entirely as a success. Among other concerns with higher education 
spending, was the so- called classification problem (Barr and Crawford 1998) 
of how to list (or classify) loans on government account books. Inquiring 
into how higher education funding should be organized in the UK, the 
Dearing Report (1997) made a number of recommendations. The report 
is mainly known in the UK for its recommendation to introduce a tuition 
fee to cover 25 percent of the cost of tuition. However, it also contained 
a seemingly obscure and technical argument. Recommendation 80 urged 
the government to consider adopting a different method to account for or 
classify student loans. The report advised: “Do not treat the repayable part 
of loans in the same way as grants to students.” The maintenance loans 
had been classified as public spending on government accounts. This paid 
no recognition to the fact that some of these loans would be repaid in the 
future. The problem would seem to be urgent, but solvable: “The Report is 
spot- on in saying that this problem needs to be fixed, and fixed fast. If not 
resolved, it is terminal. It is true that loans will bring in additional resources 
from around 2020— but you cannot revive a corpse. Resolution, in contrast, 
will release a ‘pot of gold’ of over £1 billion, immediately and every year” 
(Barr and Crawford 1998, 75, emphasis in original).
This act of reclassification of student loans needed to be accommodated 
within the accounting framework used by the UK government. At the time 
of the Dearing Report, UK government accounting reform was in full swing. 
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It started in 1993 in order to account for the complex nature of govern-
ment transactions. Founded in 1866, government accounting practice had 
been calculating profits and losses on a cash basis, focusing on cash flows 
in real time. In this way, money was accounted for when it was received or 
paid out, whereas “accruals accounts record costs and revenues as they are 
respectively incurred and earned. By contrast, cash accounting records cash 
payments and receipts when they are made” (Likierman 1995, 563).
Moving from cash accounting to the private sector technique of accruals 
accounting meant that the books showed government performance dur-
ing a financial year, rather than merely recording cash flows. Most impor-
tantly, it provided a tool to account for student loans by classifying them 
as “financial transactions” instead of an outright expenditure (which was 
how the student grants had been accounted for). From the financial year of 
2001– 02 the Department for Education and Skills (the Treasury’s responsi-
bility) was fully reliant on resource (accruals) accounting (RA) (Heald 2005).
The End of Direct Funding of English Undergraduate Teaching  
and the Income Contingent Repayment (ICR) Loans
Facilitated by the UK government accounting reform that enabled the 
reclassification of student loans, the transformation of English higher edu-
cation from a public good continued with what Hillman (2013, 259) called 
“the triumph of tuition loans.” But these triumphant loans introduced in 
1998 had a specific nature that differed from their predecessors. Whereas 
loans launched in 1990 were fixed- term mortgage- style loans, from 1998 
they were income- contingent repayment (ICR) loans covering living costs only. 
As with mortgage style loans, repayments would start only once a gradu-
ate’s income was over a certain threshold (although this changed from 85 
percent of national average earnings to a threshold of minimum earnings 
of £10,000 a year rising to £15,000 in 2003). What was new was income 
contingency. This meant that monthly repayments would be linked to a 
graduate’s salary— 9 percent on total earnings— rather than the size of the 
outstanding debt. Moreover, outstanding loans would be written off after 
a number of years.
Further changes followed. To cover “deficiencies in the university estate 
[of] £11bn” (Dearing 2004), tuition fees rose to £3,000 a year in 2006. This 
reform caused controversy in parliament, where the Higher Education 
Bill passed its second reading by only 5 votes (UK Parliament 2004). But, 
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equally important, up- front tuition fees that had been in place since 1998 
were now to be covered by the ICR loans. Here is how Nicholas Barr, a key 
figure in the 2006 reform (Barr and Crawford 2003), describes the events:
The introduction of small mortgage type loans in 1990 was a response to fis-
cal pressures from the growing system. The 1997 Dearing Report said, in effect: 
“Loans are the right way to go, but income contingent loans, not mortgage 
loans.” This was Iain Crawford’s and my great victory. Dearing had a rational 
strategy of income contingent loans, and fees of £1,000 covered by loans. That 
was a strategy— more cautious than I wanted, but a genuine stepping- stone. The 
government then subverted the strategy by introducing fees but without loans 
to cover them. The next round of reform was 2006, which was the one time 
that the government stuck to its strategy, because we had an education minister, 
Charles Clark, who was bright enough to understand the idea of a strategy and 
sufficiently a political big beast to be able to protect it from cherry- picking. So, 
the 2006 reforms included income contingent loans to cover living costs, variable 
fees of up to £3,000 fully covered by income contingent loans, and pro- access 
policies earlier in the system. That was a proper strategy. (Barr interview)
The strategy of ICR loans was designed to maintain higher education as a 
public good: resolving problems of access and problems of fairness. The prob-
lem of access posed the question of how to widen higher participation 
rates, given that the cost of a university degree is high and the return is not 
guaranteed:
Suppose that you borrow to buy a house and the repayments are £500 a month. 
If your income falls you can sell the house and repay the loan. If you borrow to 
finance a degree and the repayments are £500 a month, the risk you take is that 
if your income falls, the repayments will be an intolerable burden. So what you 
are going to do? You are not going to borrow. Or you are not going to borrow 
enough. And this is Milton Friedman writing in 1955. … The income contingent 
formula protects the borrower against low income this month, forgiveness after 
thirty years protects him/her from low life- time income. Thus the argument is the 
risk you face is contained. (Barr interview)
Nicholas Barr refers to the work of Milton Friedman (1955) here as a means 
to introduce the economic logic of ICR loans: that the policy points to a 
way of solving a market imperfection that results in underinvestment in 
human capital. The source of the imperfection is tied to mortgage- style 
“fixed money loans” that have to work without collateral— an asset that 
could be retained to reimburse the lender if the borrower cannot continue 
with repayments. The absence of collateral means the loans are risky to the 
(private) lender who might compensate the risk by high interest, but that 
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would deter the borrower. The mortgage style terms of the loan are also risky 
to the borrower, discouraged by fixed payments regardless of her future 
income. The lender could be encouraged to invest by “buy[ing] a share in 
an individual’s earning prospects,” but administering such investment is 
very costly in terms of monitoring the location and income of borrowers as 
well as the long term of the loans.7 The resulting market imperfection gives 
grounds for government to become the issuer of income contingent loans.
The second problem that ICR loans are designed to solve is the problem 
of fairness concisely captured by former Conservative Minister for Universi-
ties and Science David Willetts (2015, 14): “Even though there are public 
benefits from a graduate going into a very- well- paid job, it is not clear that 
on its own it justifies less affluent tax- payers subsidising it. Repayments by 
graduates who enjoy earnings above the average as a result of their uni-
versity education appears fair— otherwise lower income non- graduate tax 
payers would be meeting the cost of a university education.” Solving these 
two problems— of access and of fairness— through ICR loans resulted in 
the state covering only for a proportion of the costs of higher education 
provision, in particular when loans are not repaid. This public subsidy has 
continued and enabled English higher education to (at least nominally) 
retain its status as a public good.
However, the financial crisis of 2008 and the emergence of austerity 
measures in UK politics have led to further change. The Browne Report 
(2010) recommended a course of action to optimize the financing of the 
provision of higher education in England. As a result the UK coalition gov-
ernment of the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats initiated a reform in 
how it financed higher education in England. If the tuition fees introduced 
in 1998 and raised in 2006 had been providing resources in addition to 
what English universities were receiving (in the form of the direct block 
grant for teaching from the government), the increase to £9,000 a year 
in tuition fees for full- time UK and EU students was set to replace direct 
government funding in “low- cost” subjects and a significant reduction of 
government funding in “high- cost” subjects.8
The existing income contingent repayment (ICR) loans were modified 
to fit the purpose of the reform. The salary threshold at which repayments 
would kick in was raised to £21,000, and the write- off period was extended 
to thirty years (Cartwright 2016). Interest paid on outstanding loans taken 
after September 2012 varied between the Retail Price Index (RPI, when 
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income was below the threshold) and RPI plus 3 percent (while students 
were studying, but also once income is £41,000 or more, rising to 4.6 per-
cent in 2016). For pre- 2012 loans the interest rate was not changed (SLC 
2016).9 Andrew McGettigan, an expert on UK higher education and its 
financing, explains:
There are good arguments about why you do have a real interest rate on student 
loans, because then you are not subsidising wealthy people. Because the only 
people who ever likely to pay any of the interest rather than principal on these 
student loans are very high earners. So if you have zero interest rate, you are basi-
cally letting very high earners get out of the system quicker. … Most people in 
finance get this wrong— they think that the cost of student loans is the interest, 
and yet this cannot be, because the income contingent structure [of the loans]. 
The reason why the interest rate— while people are studying— is RPI plus 3 per-
cent is to stop people from wealthy background having a subsidised loans for 
three years while they are studying, invest it somewhere else, then pay it off as 
soon as they graduate. (McGettigan interview)
Since 2012– 13, the size of the issued income contingent repayment loans 
has surged, prompted by the near tripling of tuition fees (from just over 
£3,000 to £9,000), mostly covered by the ICR loans, and lifting of the cap 
on the number of high- performing students a university can enroll. In 
2015– 16 alone the amount lent to students was £11.8bn (rising from £6bn 
in 2011– 12), with total outstanding balance being £76.3bn (compared with 
£39.6bn in 2011– 12; Cartwright 2016).
Income Contingent Repayment (ICR) Loans as an Impaired Public Asset
Given the scale of lending, and the fact that the loans have been reclas-
sified on the government books as a financial asset that produces future 
revenues rather than a direct and irredeemable cost, the question of crucial 
importance is how to value repayments to government made in thirty years? 
When a sum of money is lent in a conventional way, fixed- period repay-
ments start coming in immediately after borrowing and, given the interest 
paid on the borrowed amount, bigger repayments are made by the borrower 
in the early years of the loan. This certainty makes it quite straightforward 
to know the full sum borrowed together with interest and when the out-
standing balance will be cleared. However, the income contingent nature of 
student loan repayments has a corollary. An ICR loan is a long- term (thirty- 
year) asset, with most of the repayments accruing in the future (once, and if, 
the graduate’s income rises). Consider, for instance, an ICR loan of £40,351 
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a UK student took out in 2012 to cover their tuition fees and maintenance 
expenses for three years of study. The highest growth of their real earnings 
and thus highest repayments are estimated to be coming in 2027– 29 (Sheph-
ard 2013, 3), while a certain proportion of the loans will not be repaid in 
full, or at all, if the graduate’s income is never above the threshold. In other 
words, the financial asset will not generate value equal to what is spent on 
issuing the loans today or, using economic terms, the face value of the asset 
is not the same as its fair value, therefore the asset is impaired.
Since the impairment is the value that is never going to be returned to 
government, it is viewed as a cost (i.e., public spending on university teach-
ing in England). As such it has various elements to cover for, which reflect 
not only nonpayments per se (due to death, disability, and income below 
the threshold) but also the cost of money used to issue the ICR loans (the 
interest rate subsidy). As a cost, the impairment needs to be budgeted for 
today. Yet how should this sum be calculated of what will not be repaid in 
the future? Keeping in mind that student loans are the biggest financial asset 
on the government books— it amounted to £76bn in 2016 (UK Government 
2016)— it makes the techniques of valuation that will account for ICR loans, 
specifically for the size of the asset’s impairment, of particular importance: 
“The accounting has changed several times with student loans. It’s one of 
the most dynamic aspects of accounting. … Government is experimenting 
here; it’s doing something that has not really been done before [because] 
there is no commercial expertise to draw on, there is no preexistent data-
bases, so you need a good accounting system” (McGettingan interview).
A discount rate is a measure instrumental in resource accounting (the 
initial valuation practice that made it possible to consider student loans as 
an asset). A discount rate can accommodate time difference in the ICR loans’ 
costs and revenues, and can thus be used to determine the size of impair-
ment of ICR student loans. The impairment is called the Resource Account-
ing and Budgeting (RAB) charge by the UK government. To calculate this 
charge (or to put a figure on the government commitment to cover for what 
will not be returned by graduates) is a twofold task. Since the impairment 
is the difference in two values (face and fair), it should be found by subtrac-
tion that is only possible once a fair value, or net present value (NPV), of 
the future incoming payments is calculated (UK Government 2016a). For 
instance, if a graduate who took a loan in 2017 is forecast to pay £1,000 in 
2027, how much is this worth now? This valuation is done by discounting 
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payment forecasts back to the time of issuing the loans. This involves apply-
ing the discount rate produced by the Treasury department with the advice 
of the Financial Reporting Advisory Board (FRAB). The current discount rate 
that is applied to repayment forecasts is the Retail Price Index (RPI) plus 0.7 
percent. So the graduate’s payment of £1,000 in 2027 is worth £933 today:
£933 = £1000
(1 + 0.007)10[years]
But this calculation is for illustration only. The precise monetary value 
is indicated “as a proportion of the initial loan outlay” and currently is 
between 41 percent and 52 percent (with an RPI higher than 1), which 
could be viewed as for each £1 lent the return is 48– 59 pence (UK Govern-
ment 2019). Since its first introduction as part of the funding policy in 
2011, the RAB charge proved to be rather volatile. Initially estimated at 
between 28 percent and 30 percent, by the beginning of 2014 it had risen 
to 45 percent. Gavan Conlon, a partner in London- based economic policy 
consultancy that undertook RAB charge modeling, reflects on the change:
Initially, the Browne [Review] suggested that the RAB charge would be unchanged, 
which is absolutely nonsensical. Then, over the next three to four years it was 
revised from 30 percent to 32 percent to 35 percent to 40 percent and it finished 
at 45 percent. The reason why the RAB charge estimate increased to approxi-
mately 45 percent was because it is vastly dependent on both the size of the loans 
offered to students (which increased sharply) but also graduate earning growth 
(which was much lower than expected). (Conlon interview)
In 2014, the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR, an independent exam-
iner of the UK public finances) lowered its forecast of loan repayments due 
to the low “earnings growth for less well- paid graduates.” Coupled with 
higher tuition fees that pushed up the size of the loans, the rise of the 
RAB charge caused controversy as it would seem that the government “has 
saved little or no public money by trebling fees to £9,000 and scrapping 
direct [teaching] grant” (Morgan 2014).
In March 2015, the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) issued a report where 
it calculated the way the RAB charge could be lower if the discount rate 
was RPI+1.1 percent rather than RPI+2.2 percent (the discount rate used in 
RAB calculation at the time) arguing that “the assumption made about the 
discount rate is a key driver of this debate”: “What is clear from our analysis 
is that the discount rate matters hugely when estimating the cost of higher 
education. In fact, it matters more than plausible changes to the rate of real 
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earnings growth. Reducing the discount rate means valuing future repay-
ments more highly; hence the estimated loan subsidy (and the RAB charge) 
falls” (Britton and Crawford 2015).
A change in assumptions regarding future repayments of the loans had 
been called for since 2012, when a letter in the Financial Times argued that 
if the discount rate were linked to the actual cost of government borrow-
ing, it would be “sufficient to completely eliminate the predicted losses” 
(Leunig and Shephard 2012). Indeed, the discount rate that the govern-
ment used in their RAB calculation was set in 2006 and bore no relation to 
its cost of borrowing:
If you are a commercial operator, or a company, you set [the discount rate] first 
in relation to your cost of borrowing, and also expectation of inflation, and alter-
native investment opportunities, and you set your discount rate at your safest 
investment opportunity [but] this was never set in relation to cost of borrowing 
[and] we don’t know which gilts [bonds issued by the government] have paid for 
student loans. (McGettigan interview)
In December 2015, the Treasury announced that “the real financial instru-
ment discount rate to be applied at 31 March 2016 is 0.7 [and] the rate as 
applied to flows expressed in current prices is RPI + 0.7, where the financial 
instrument is index linked to RPI” (UK Government 2015a). The reduction 
of the discount rate drove the RAB charge from 45 percent down to 20– 25 
percent and “by the stroke of the pen all those estimates, all the figures 
have become happy figures”:
It undercuts the Labour party, their whole strategy gets undermined, because 
they’re attacking the RAB charge, suddenly the RAB charge drops 20 percent— 
nothing to attack. Strategically, politically it’s brilliant and obvious. At the same 
time it changes the budgeting for the Department for Business and Innovation, 
and for the Department for Education now that got responsible for student 
loans— they now don’t have a budget crisis. (McGettigan interview)
The “budget crisis” here relates to the Departmental Expenditure Limit 
(DEL) of the department responsible for HE (it used to be the Department 
for Business, Innovation and Skills, or BIS). Each year the Treasury allocates 
a certain amount of budget to cover the RAB charge for the new loans issued 
that year. At the same time the existing loans are revalued, and if their value 
is less than budgeted for then the department covers the difference from a 
“stock charge,” which is part of the RAB charge within their DEL. However, 
since the RAB charge was growing quickly and steadily, and Department 
budgets until the end of 2015 were set in 2010, the BIS department needed 
Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/books/book/chapter-pdf/677248/9780262359030_c000900.pdf by guest on 02 June 2021
276 Sveta Milyaeva and Daniel Neyland
more money to cover for it. As a result, the accounting rules changed in 
2013 to provide additional funds for unexpected volatility— Annually Man-
aged Expenditure (AME). This has to be “serviced.” The Treasury charges BIS 
“a thirtieth of it every year for 30 years, it’s like an internal loan but within 
your own budget,” which needs to be paid with real money and “this pay-
ment goes in cash from their budget.” The “lower discount rate … reduce[d] 
the spread between the target impairment and the current RAB charge, 
which … then translate[d] into a smaller spillover into other expenditure 
reductions” (McGettigan interview; McGettigan 2015a, 41).
Given the volatility in size of the impairment that is, arguably, arbitrarily 
managed through the discount rate, as well as the contingent nature of the 
rules governing budget that covers for the asset’s impairment, the tech-
nique by which the ICR loans are accounted for is highly consequential. 
But, as Nick Hillman pointed out, “there [were] a number of reasons of why 
the RAB charge fell, it was not just the discount rate” (Hillman interview). 
He explained during a hearing in the House of Lords Select Committee on 
Economic Affairs: “The system has some flex built into it: you can change 
the terms and conditions of the loans” (House of Lords 2016). Subsequently 
Philippa Lloyd, the director general of higher and further education at 
the Department for Education (responsible for the loans since July 2016), 
was asked whether the question of higher education funding is gradually 
becoming a question of “managing the loan book.” She replied, “You may 
decide to adjust levers in order to keep it [the higher education funding pol-
icy] on a sustainable footing” (House of Lords 2016). For example, one of 
the “levers” was the earning threshold of £21,000 beyond which graduates 
would have to start repaying loans. This was controversially frozen for five 
years (2015– 2020) despite a promise to change it according to national aver-
age earnings (Elgot 2016). Managing the loan book thus involves steering 
higher education funding in certain directions and, as McGettigan (2015a, 
43) argues, “is pushing policymakers towards certain solutions, which may 
not be in the general interest of universities and colleges or students.”
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have explored the ways in which the reorganization 
of government funding for English higher education has created a public 
asset. In doing so, we have steered away from more general public and 
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academic debates on English higher education focused on marketization 
(Molesworth et al. 2011), neoliberalization (Canaan and Shumar 2008), or 
financialization (Holmwood 2014). Instead, we oriented notions of finan-
cialization (Chiapello 2015; Engelen 2008; Van Der Zwan 2014; Davis and 
Kim 2015) toward problems tackled within the public sector and drew our 
inspiration from studies of the practices of economic valuation in public 
goods (Roscoe and Townley 2016; Doganova and Laurent 2016; Pallesen 
2016; O’Brien 2016) and through forms of capitalization (Muniesa 2012) 
and assetization (Birch 2017). From here, we suggested an expansion of 
pragmatics of valuation by returning to Dewey (1937) and paying close 
attention to what is done to what in the accomplishment of assets. Although 
this has required a detailed study of the mundane details of the seemingly 
technical processes of assetization, we suggest this is immensely important 
given the long- lasting and highly political consequences of these processes 
that indeed give the new meaning to “the role and subjectivity … of public 
service users and providers” (Mennicken and Muniesa 2017).
Our empirical focus drew together complex successive actions through 
which English higher education and student loans came to occupy a partic-
ular asset form (see Birch and Muniesa, this volume). This focus on succes-
sion enables us to move away from any sense that these policies followed a 
single logic or intent. As Nick Hillman, the former chief of staff and special 
adviser for the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills once put it, 
“The fact that higher fees could make higher education more like a regu-
lated market, with students coming to resemble consumers, was a bonus, 
but it was not the primary purpose” (Hillman 2016, 338– 339). In this way, 
interventions in English higher education were successive in the sense that 
each basis for putting forward a means to resolve an issue built on previous 
attempts at resolution and on- going concerns raised regarding the form of 
resolution.
What began, then, as an articulated concern over the sustainability of 
public financing of university teaching came to be understood as resolvable 
through mortgage style fixed repayment loans. Yet the loans appeared to 
trigger a “classification problem” (Barr and Crawford 1998)— unlike other 
forms of government spending, these were not a straightforward cost but 
an initial outlay that would at some point bring in a return. The classifi-
cation problem coincided with governmental accounting reform and the 
switch from cash accounting to accrual or resource accounting that took 
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place over several years of UK government action. At the same time, con-
cerns were raised regarding the fixed thresholds and fixed repayment terms 
of the loans, which seemed to undermine government policy and universi-
ties’ hopes to ensure fair access to higher education. The public good was 
getting in the way of the financial asset.
Issuing Income Contingent Repayment (ICR) loans became a means to 
apparently repair this deficiency. With repayments indexed to fluctuations 
in salary and debts canceled after a fixed period, the public good would be 
transformed into an asset. Yet this also made it more challenging to value 
the emerging asset, as the size of repayments, length of term and even the 
possibility of any payments at all, were rendered less secure. Although vari-
ous accounting techniques (such as discount rates) could be used to calcu-
late a present value for these future repayment- based income streams, these 
values were below the amount lent to students. Accounting techniques 
made the loans appear as a significant cost to government, especially as 
student numbers and then loan amounts increased significantly in a short 
space of time, particularly when tuition fees were tripled. Although a RAB 
charge could be used to cover this shortfall, economists made clear in their 
discussion of the discount rate and the necessity to lower it: “note that 
nothing ‘real’ has changed. No additional repayments are being made; we 
have simply changed how highly we value these future repayments in the 
present” (Britton and Crawford 2015, emphasis added).
Our close focus on the pragmatics of valuation draws attention to what is 
done to what in the constitution of this peculiar impaired asset. Yet its impair-
ment appears to be an inescapable feature of the type of asset it became. 
Moreover, ultimately, the tenacious impairment would seem to become so 
looming that the process of turning the public good into an asset has been 
reversed. In December 2018, the UK Office for National Statistics ruled that 
the way income contingent student loans are accounted for, specifically the 
RAB charge, is to be changed and the loans are to be “reclassified as public 
spending” (Coughlan 2018). Student loans proved to be not just any asset, 
available to be made sense of through standard techniques of accounting. 
Impairment results from the continuing need of the UK government to cover 
the costs of loans’ income contingency that provides the current UK govern-
ment basis for dealing with fair access. In this way, impairment fundamen-
tally affected the ability of higher education to move from a public good to 
an asset that retains (at least nominally) its goodness: a public asset.
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Notes
1.  We are aware of the fact that the concept of higher education as a (nonexclud-
able) public good could be criticized given that it is different from compulsory 
primary and secondary education as higher education is “a matter of choice” (Barr 
2012, 491). However, here we term English higher education a public good because 
until 2012 for the most part it had been financed through general taxation.
2.  The Treasury as well as the Board of Education had been providing some financial 
assistance to universities in the form of grants since 1907 (Owen 1980). Also, the UGC’s 
influence on higher education in England and the UK went beyond direct allocation 
of financial support, but given the focus of the essay we discuss its financial activity.
3.  Granted that the tuition fee payments by local authorities “were partially means- 
tested until the late 1970s” (Hillman 2013, 251).
4.  With the exception of the University College of Buckingham, which was founded 
in 1976 as an independent (not financed by the state) higher education institution 
(Shattock 1994).
5.  The 1992 Further and Higher Education (Scotland) Act made separate HE funding 
provisions for Scotland.
6.  By 1989 with the introduction of the Research Assessment Exercises (RAEs had 
been initiated by the UGC in 1985) the financial provisions (block grants) for 
teaching and research were set apart and, following the change from the UGC to 
HEFCE, the system of financial provision for higher education that had been formed 
through the establishment of the UGC as a main body providing vision for as well as 
management of university funding, ceased to exist (Shattock 1994).
7.  Notably, the unusual nature of the loans is said to be the reason the agency that 
currently administers UK ICR loans, the Student Loan Company— owned by the UK 
government and devolved administrations— is called a company. According to Wil-
letts (2015, 18) the name was initially chosen in “the expectation that the clearing 
banks would co- own it and lend the funds [but] they backed out because the scheme 
was so different from their usual commercial lending.”
8.  The “low- cost” subjects are Arts and Humanities, Mathematics, Law, and Business, 
whereas “high- cost” subjects are Clinical Medicine, Science, Engineering, and Tech-
nology. McGettigan (2013, 27) shows how the funding for full- time undergraduate 
study per student fell from £3,898 and £2,709 for “low- cost” subjects in 2011– 12 to 
no government funding in 2012– 13, whereas the funding for “high- cost” subjects was 
significantly reduced— from £14,601 and £5,484 to £10,000 and £1,500, respectively.
9.  Although there was a proposal to increase the interest rates for pre- 2012 loans in 
order to make the loan book attractive for private purchasers in government asset 
sell- off (Chakrabortty 2013; McGettigan 2015b).
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